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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ELECTION LAW ORIGINALISM: THE SUPREME COURT'S
ELITIST CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY
YASMIN DAWOOD*
INTRODUCTION
Election law faces significant, even unprecedented, challenges in our
modern social media world. As Richard Hasen argues, these challenges include
rapid technological innovation, false and misleading speech, foreign
disinformation campaigns, the decline of accepted neutral arbiters of fact and
truth, voter mistrust, information silos, and an increasingly hyper-partisan
political climate. 1 Professor Hasen develops carefully crafted legal tools to
respond to such challenges, including labeling and disclosure laws, but he is
attentive to the fundamental dilemma that the cure can often be worse than the
disease, and that regulations intended to address these serious problems may
pose threats to democratic functioning itself.
Yet even the standard topics of election law—such as campaign finance,
electoral redistricting, and voter qualification laws—are likewise facing a deeply
uncertain future in large part due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions.
This Essay addresses some of these issues at a macro level by focusing on the
larger, conceptual questions at stake. In particular, it considers two inter-related
questions. First: How should we conceptualize the role of the Supreme Court as
an institution in these decisions? Second: What is the underlying conception of
democracy that best elucidates the Court’s major election law decisions in the
last decade or so? While it is entirely possible that no such underlying

* Canada Research Chair in Democracy, Constitutionalism, and Electoral Law, and Associate
Professor, University of Toronto Faculty of Law and Department of Political Science; J.D.
Columbia Law School, Ph.D (Political Science) University of Chicago. I am grateful to Richard
Albert, Guy Charles, Giacomo Delledonne, Monica Eppinger, Chad Flanders, Mark Graber,
Richard Hasen, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Franita Tolson, Daniel Tokaji, and participants at the
Childress Memorial Lecture Symposium and the European Constitutional Discussion Group on the
Future of Federalism, for helpful comments and conversations. My thanks as well to Dan Blair and
the editorial team for their careful work on this Essay.
1. See Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law in
a “Post-Truth” World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (2020) (Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture).
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conception is held by the justices, 2 we can consider the question objectively by
evaluating the cases from an external perspective. 3
To address these questions, this Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes
the Supreme Court’s recent election law decisions to determine if there is a
consistent approach to the judicial function in supervising the electoral process.
In recent years, the Court majority has become increasingly hostile to the
regulation of campaign finance and has acted strenuously against measures
meant to level the playing field. 4 This active intervention stands in notable
contrast to its point blank refusal to intervene in partisan gerrymandering. 5 At
the same time, the Court majority intervened to effectively end the preclearance
protections under the Voting Rights Act despite the support these provisions had
long enjoyed from Congress. 6 Is the Court, or at least the conservative majority,
exiting the political thicket? Or is it deregulating the electoral process? Part I
argues that the Supreme Court’s role cannot be easily reduced to a single or
consistent approach. It is a complex picture. The Court’s intervention appears to
be tactical and results-driven rather than being oriented by a particular theory of
the judicial function in supervising the law of democracy.
Part II argues that instead of a consistent theory of the judicial function, the
Court majority’s recent election law opinions, when viewed from an external
perspective, display a particular vision of democracy that is fundamentally elitist
in its outlook. This elitist vision of democracy presents a significant challenge
to the egalitarian conception of democracy that was evident in the Supreme
Court’s election law decisions in the decades following the civil rights era. The
elitist approach also stands in marked contrast to the egalitarian approach to
democracy that is evident in the dissenting opinions of the four liberal justices.
It claims further that this elitist conception of democracy is a familiar one—it
has certain continuities (and discontinuities) with theories of republicanism that
existed at the time of the Founding. To illustrate these continuities, this Part
excavates founding era themes from the Court’s recent election law decisions.
Given the echo of founding era themes, Part III considers the role of
originalism in current election law decisions. It concludes that neither the
Court’s decisions, nor the emerging elitist conception of democracy, fall within
2. We might also think that there ought not to be a grand theory of democracy that is guiding
the Court. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics—And Be
Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 245
(David K. Ryden, ed., 2000).
3. In past work, I have addressed the Supreme Court’s conceptions of democracy. See e.g.
Yasmin Dawood, Democracy, Power, and the Supreme Court: Campaign Finance Reform in
Comparative Context, 4 INTL. J. OF CONST. L. 269, 271 (2006) (arguing that judicial decisions on
the electoral process are at base disputes among competing visions of democracy).
4. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
5. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019).
6. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
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originalism strictly understood. That being said, this Part suggests that some of
the Court majority’s arguments display an originalist orientation in which
original meaning takes a preponderant weight in the analysis even if it does not
compel the overall outcome.
In practical terms, this originalist orientation has significant implications for
future election law cases because it means that, at least for some issues, the
founding era is serving as an implicit baseline for the conservative wing of the
Court. Part III identifies three ways in which the Court majority’s originalist
orientation matters: first, non-originalist precedents would likely carry less
precedential weight; second, election law federalism would likely be interpreted
in a manner hostile to egalitarian ideals; and third, electoral reform efforts could
be thwarted. In future cases, the Supreme Court majority’s originalist orientation
will likely further erode the egalitarian approach to democracy, thereby
rendering democratic self-government less inclusive, less equal, and less
responsive to the people.
I. THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY
The question of what, if anything, courts ought to do in the supervision of
democracy has long been the subject of considerable scholarly debate. 7 In the
last decade, however, the Supreme Court has implicitly abandoned many of the
theories used to describe its decisions of the preceding decades. John Hart Ely’s
influential participation-reinforcing justification of judicial review, 8 while
reflected in the malapportionment cases, 9 was completely absent in the Court’s
recent partisan gerrymandering decision. 10 Theories of racial equality were
evident in the racial vote dilution cases, 11 but were considerably muted in a
recent case that eliminated a key provision of the Voting Rights Act. 12
Arguments about preventing the distorting effects of vast wealth on the electoral
process were relied upon in prior campaign finance cases, 13 but were roundly
rejected in recent cases. 14 The conspicuous absence of these longstanding
7. For a summary, see Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial
Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1420–27 (2008).
8. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 181
(1981).
9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 192 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 4 (1964);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964).
10. See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). For an elaboration of this
argument, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court, SUP. CT. REV.
(forthcoming).
11. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982).
12. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 535 (2013).
13. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber
of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 653 (1990); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003).
14. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185,
229 (2014).
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theories and justifications marks an extraordinary turn in the Supreme Court’s
election law jurisprudence.
The question of the Supreme Court’s role was central to the Court’s most
recent election law decision, Rucho v. Common Cause, 15 in which a five to four
majority of the Court held that partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable
political question. 16 At issue in Rucho, and its companion case Lamone v.
Benisek, were the North Carolina and Maryland congressional districting maps,
which had been struck down by lower courts as unconstitutional partisan
gerrymanders. 17 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the
districting plans were “highly partisan, by any measure” 18 and that the record
contained evidence that the maps were drawn deliberately to entrench partisan
advantage. 19 For the majority, the central issue was whether the problem of
partisan gerrymandering amounted to “claims of legal right, resolvable
according to legal principles, or political questions that must find their resolution
elsewhere.” 20 The Court concluded that “partisan gerrymandering claims
present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts” 21 and
moreover, that federal judges “have no license to reallocate political power
between the two major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority in
the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and direct their decisions.” 22
The Court majority’s first set of arguments concerned the Elections Clause,
and here the majority essentially reproduced Justice Frankfurter’s analysis in
Colegrove v Green. 23 In Colegrove, a four to three plurality of the Court held
that the malapportionment of state legislatures was not justiciable. 24 Drawing on
an analysis of the Elections Clause in Article I Section 4 of the Constitution,
Justice Frankfurter argued that “the Constitution has conferred upon Congress
exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States,” 25 leaving no role
for the judiciary. The majority opinion in Rucho provided a similar analysis of
the Elections Clause and concluded on a similar note: under the terms of the
Constitution, and as endorsed by the Framers, the solution for partisan
gerrymandering lay with Congress and not with the federal judiciary. 26
15. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2490–91. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Roberts joined by
Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.
16. Id. at 2506–07.
17. The North Carolina map, which was at issue in Rucho, disfavored Democrats, while the
Maryland map, which was at issue in Lamone, disfavored Republicans. Id. at 2487.
18. Id. at 2491.
19. Id. at 2492.
20. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494.
21. Id. at 2506–07.
22. Id. at 2507.
23. Colegrove v Green, 328 U.S. 549, 550 (1946).
24. Id. at 556.
25. Id. at 554.
26. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494-96.
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The Court majority then provided reasons as to why there are no standards
to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering. One reason is that partisan
gerrymandering involves fundamental questions about fair representation and
the allocation of political power—a matter that falls outside of the Court’s
authority and expertise. 27 The majority’s analysis was reminiscent of Justice
Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr, 28 in which he argued that:
Talk of “debasement” or “dilution” is circular talk. One cannot speak of
“debasement” or “dilution” of the value of a vote until there is first defined a
standard of reference as to what a vote should be worth. What is actually asked
of the Court in this case is to choose among competing bases of representation—
ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy—in order
to establish an appropriate frame of government . . . for all the States of the
Union. 29

In a similar vein, the Court majority argued that it is impossible to know what
fairness looks like, illustrating the difficulty with various alternate scenarios of
how political fairness could be measured. 30 Not only are these different visions
of fairness political rather than legal in nature, argued the majority, they also do
not shed light on the dividing line between permissible and unconstitutional
partisanship. 31 In addition, the majority posited that partisan gerrymandering
claims are ultimately rooted in a desire for proportional representation, a concept
that is alien to the Constitution and the Framers’ vision. 32
In the remainder of the opinion, the Court majority considered and
ultimately rejected all the proposed standards for adjudicating partisan
gerrymandering. The majority dismissed the standards from the
malapportionment and racial gerrymandering cases. 33 It rejected the standard of
non-partisanship because this approach “would essentially countermand the
Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political entities.” 34 Instead, the
standard must identify when partisan gerrymandering is excessive—an objective
which has eluded the Court in all its prior partisan gerrymandering cases. 35 The
Court majority also rejected all the other proposed approaches, including the

27. Id. at 2499–2500.
28. Baker, 369 U.S. at 300; for a similar argument, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 10.
29. Baker, 369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500.
31. Id. at 2501.
32. Id. at 2499.
33. Id. at 2501–02.
34. Id. at 2497.
35. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497–98 (discussing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973),
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 367 (2004), and LULAC v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)).
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plaintiffs’ tests, 36 associational rights arguments, 37 and the argument that state
officials did not have the authority under the Elections Clause to disfavor the
supporters of a particular candidate when drawing district lines. 38
As Justice Kagan’s powerful dissent makes clear, and as various
commentators have observed, the Court majority’s decision is vulnerable to
criticism on a number of fronts. 39 The majority’s claim that there are no
judicially manageable standards is belied by the fact that the lower courts have
applied standards to identify extreme gerrymanders. As Justice Kagan pointed
out, the three part test consisting of (1) intent; (2) effects; and (3) causation
around which the lower courts had coalesced was not an unfamiliar one and has
been used to determine similar types of claims. 40 These standards, noted the
dissent, do not depend on judges’ views on electoral fairness nor do they involve
courts too deeply in the political process as they are designed to correct only the
most egregious partisan gerrymanders. 41 And while it is true that a line has to be
drawn somewhere to identify the threshold at which a partisan gerrymander is
too extreme, courts are routinely called upon to engage in this kind of linedrawing. 42
By refusing to step in to address extreme partisan gerrymandering in Rucho,
we might conclude that the Court has retreated from the political thicket in
keeping with Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Colegrove v Green. The same logic
could be applied more generally: on this view, we would expect the Roberts
Court to adopt a general posture of judicial restraint and non-intervention in
election law cases. But then we immediately run into a problem. How do we
explain Shelby County v. Holder? 43 In Shelby County, the Court majority did
36. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502.
37. Id. at 2504–05.
38. Id. at 2506.
39. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 10; Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer,
Dirty Thinking About Law and Democracy in Rucho v. Common Cause, 3 AM. CONST. SOC. SUP.
CT. REV. 293, 295 (2019) https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ACS-SupremeCourt-Review-2018-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE2P-J22Y] [hereinafter, “Dirty Thinking”]
(arguing that the Rucho majority engages in a “narrative of non-intervention”); Guy-Uriel E.
Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial Restraint, 132 HARV. L. REV.
236, 239–40 (2018) (describing the narrative of non-intervention).
40. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Neutrality is assured because the baseline is the state’s
own characteristics rather than some abstract notion of an “ideally fair” map. The state’s actual
map is compared to a series of maps that could have been drawn if politicians had not been trying
to maximize partisan gain. Id. at 2520 (Kagan, J., dissenting). For the Court majority, however,
taking into account the state’s individual characteristics meant that there is no uniform standard in
operation since the criteria will shift from state to state. Id. at 2505. But as Justice Kagan observed,
this is “a virtue, not a vice—a feature, not a bug” because it prevents judges’ own preferences from
affecting the analysis. Id. at 2521 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 2522 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
43. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 529 (2013).
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intervene to strike down a longstanding provision of the Voting Rights Act—a
statute that has had overwhelming bipartisan congressional support for
decades. 44 The Court majority invalidated a provision containing the “coverage
formula” which identified those jurisdictions that had to seek prior federal
approval, known as preclearance, for all changes to voting procedures. 45 The
decision effectively gutted the preclearance process which had for years blocked
discriminatory voting practices. A similar pattern emerges in the campaign
finance context. In Citizens United v. FEC 46 the Court majority struck down
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act which restricted independent
expenditures for political communications by corporations. Likewise, the Court
majority held in McCutcheon v. FEC 47 that aggregate contributions limits in the
Federal Election Campaign Act were unconstitutional.
It would appear at first glance that in Shelby County, Citizens United, and
McCutcheon, the Court actively intervened in the democratic process to strike
down statutory provisions that had received widespread congressional support.
The Court did not exercise judicial restraint nor did it exit the political thicket.
However, the net effect of the Shelby County decision was to effectively
eliminate the preclearance process and therefore remove certain types of election
issues from judicial or executive oversight. As for the campaign finance
decisions, the net effect was to circumscribe the ability of legislatures to make
rules in the first instance. This stands in contrast to the aftermath of Shelby
County, which removed federal executive and judicial oversight over state
legislatures, thereby freeing them to enact laws untrammeled by the preclearance
process.
The judicial function in these cases could be described as a kind of
deregulation. But we ought to be careful in how we use that term. In some
instances, it means that there will be classic deregulation in the sense of fewer
rules. In other instances, however, what we have is not an absence of rules or
rule-making so much as an absence of guidelines or oversight cabining
legislative discretion to regulate. The Court majority has intervened to shield
from oversight certain kinds of legislative rule-making with respect to certain
voting rules (Shelby County), while in other areas, it has prevented legislatures
from regulating certain aspects of the electoral process (Citizens United). In
other cases, it has refused to intervene in the electoral process thereby providing
legislatures with a green light to pass electoral laws (Rucho). The net result
consists of a patchwork: for some issues, such as voter qualification rules and

44. Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL
RIGHTS J. 713, 713–14, 726–27 (describing the majority decision as an “audacious” opinion
which displays false minimalism).
45. Shelby Cty,. 570 U.S. at 550–51.
46. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010).
47. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 185 (2014).
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partisan gerrymandering, there is extensive and often unchecked legislative
activity, while with respect to other areas, such as campaign finance, legislatures
have increasingly less discretion to regulate.
According to Nicholas Stephanopoulos, the common thread underlying
these cases is that the Supreme Court is now an anti-Carolene court in that it
fails to remedy obvious malfunctions in the political process while
simultaneously blocking other institutions from doing so. 48 I agree that Rucho
and the Court’s other decisions do not follow Ely’s theory of judicial review,
and, as I elaborate in Part II below, a possible reason for this is that the Court
majority’s decisions, whether intended or not, are increasingly espousing an
elitist conception of democracy. Guy-Uriel Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
argue that in Rucho the conservative justices have subscribed to a traditional
understanding of politics in which dirty, partisan politics are viewed as being a
normal part of the political process. 49 On this view, the Court is ill-equipped to
clean up what is an inherently sordid and unfair process. While the argument I
set out in Part II below differs in the details, I agree that what is at stake in the
cases is a particular understanding of representative government.
Another possibility is that the differences among the cases are the product
of the underlying constitutional provisions: the First Amendment versus the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—and I think this is right
to some degree. But it is also the case that the First Amendment means what it
does today because of how the Court majority has chosen to interpret it in recent
years—and the same is true of the Fourteenth Amendment. 50 Given the
empirical research on judicial decision-making, 51 it is also possible that the
justices’ voting patterns in these cases boil down to simple partisan politics, a
position that is persuasively defended by Professor Stephanopoulos. 52 On this
view, the justices will likely opt for those outcomes that favor the political party
that matches their partisan preferences. A related possibility is that the justices
have opted for those outcomes that are favored by like-minded elites who belong
to the same social, political, and professional networks. 53

48. Stephanopoulos, supra note 10.
49. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking, supra note 39, at 298.
50. Daniel P. Tokaji, Denying Systemic Equality: The Last Words of the Kennedy Court, 13
HARV. L. & POL. REV. 539, 539 (2019). See generally ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014).
51. There is an extensive scholarly literature on judicial decision-making, which either builds
upon or reacts to the attitudinal model. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
52. Stephanopoulos, supra note 10, at 21 (arguing that the Court’s decisions can be understood
on partisan grounds).
53. LAWRENCE BAUM & NEAL DEVINS, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN
DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 15 (2019).
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The main point, though, is that it is a complex picture when it comes to the
Supreme Court’s role in the law of democracy. With respect to the Court’s
conservative majority, it is not straightforwardly an exit from the political thicket
nor a straightforward commitment to deregulation. Nor is the Court majority
simply a passive actor even when apparently exercising judicial restraint. Its
decision to not intervene in partisan gerrymandering, for example, is an active
choice to the extent that it cements in place the status quo. 54 Instead, the Court
majority appears to have adopted a results-oriented approach that relies on a
suite of tactical moves.
II. ELITIST VS. EGALITARIAN CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
Rather than setting forth a consistent theory of the judicial function in a
democracy, the Supreme Court’s election law decisions are better understood as
instantiating a particular vision of democracy. Whether intended or not, the
decisions by the Roberts Court result in a vision of democracy that is decidedly
elitist in nature. This claim is not meant to establish a causal explanation of these
cases; instead, it is an assessment of what the cases amount to when considered
objectively as a whole. To be sure, the elitist approach may be the accidental
result of a combination of the following factors: the Court’s absolutist approach
to the First Amendment, its restrictive approach to the equal protection clause,
and its pro-states interpretation of federalism. 55 That being said, the emerging
elitist conception of democracy displayed in recent election law decisions is
troubling because it represents a direct challenge to the egalitarian conception of
democracy that was largely supported by the Supreme Court in the decades
following the civil rights era.
Under an elitist conception of democracy, power is held in the hands of a
privileged few, and political structures and state policies are oriented to a large
degree, though not necessarily exclusively, to benefit their interests. Elitist
democracy can be contrasted with an egalitarian conception of democracy under
which the structures of governance and state policies tend to follow the principle
of political equality. In an egalitarian democracy, power is held by the people
and is deployed to benefit their interests on a more or less equal basis. One
advantage to using the term “elitist,” rather than “undemocratic,” is that the
concept of elitism better captures a crucial feature of elitist democracy, which is
the co-existence of anti-egalitarian impulses with otherwise democratic
processes. Without doubt, an elitist democracy is clearly “undemocratic” by
contemporary egalitarian understandings of democracy.
One possible objection to the argument that the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions instantiate an elitist approach to democracy is that when the Court
54. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 68–92 (1993) (defining and elaborating
the concept of status quo neutrality).
55. My thanks to Chad Flanders for very helpful comments on the ideas in this paragraph.
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intervenes (or fails to intervene) it is not benefitting all elites but rather
conservative Republican ones. 56 Under an elitist approach, government laws and
policies favor the few. As such, the elitist approach will disfavor Democratic/left
elites in various dimensions and particularly when Democratic elites are trying
to implement egalitarian policies and rules. For this reason, the elitist approach
is often in line with the policy preferences of Republican elites but not
Democratic elites. More generally, the elitist/egalitarian divide at times maps on
to the partisan Republican/Democratic divide.
This elitist conception of democracy, I further suggest, has certain
continuities and discontinuities with historic approaches to democracy, in
particular with republican theories of representation and governance at the time
of the Founding. 57 This Part argues that the Constitution established an elitist
democracy, and that the Framers, in particular James Madison, favored an elitist
conception of democracy. It then discusses conceptual resemblances between
the Court’s election law cases and elitist themes from the time of the framing
with respect to three issues: the role of the wealthy, the role of the people, and
the management of elections. It claims that the cases taken together amount to
an elitist approach to democracy, one which echoes certain framing-era ideas
about who should rule and why.
A.

The Framers’ Elitist Conception of Democracy

An examination of James Madison’s writings supports the view that the
Constitution was designed to establish an elitist democracy. 58 For Madison, one
of the greatest threats to the survival of republican government was the
instability caused by warring factions organized around the unequal distribution
of wealth. 59 Given this existential threat, a fundamental objective of the
constitutional framework was to protect the property interests of a wealthy
minority from the claims of a propertyless majority, while at the same time
protecting the rights of persons in a manner consistent with republican
principles. 60 The dilemma, though, was that the interests of the wealthy were in

56. My thanks to Nick Stephanopoulos for a very helpful discussion on the relationship
between partisan polarization and the elitist approach to democracy.
57. There is considerable debate about whether the Framers established a democracy or a
republic. For the purposes of this Essay, I will use the term “democracy” to describe the
representative system of self-government established by the Constitution.
58. This discussion is drawn from Yasmin Dawood, The New Inequality: Constitutional
Democracy and the Problem of Wealth, 67 MARYLAND L. REV. 123, 126–31 (2007).
59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 46–48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
60. See THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES
MADISON 395 (Marvin Meyers ed., Univ. Press of New England 1981) [hereinafter Property and
Suffrage]; JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 5 (1990).
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jeopardy in a system of universal suffrage, while the interests of the poor were
at risk in a system of restricted suffrage. 61 As Madison put it:
Allow the right [to vote] exclusively to property, and the rights of persons may
be oppressed. The feudal polity alone sufficiently proves it. Extend it equally to
all, and the rights of property or the claims of justice may be overruled by a
majority without property, or interested in measures of injustice. 62

The risk presented by universal suffrage was that power would eventually be
held by the unpropertied majority. 63 Madison believed that once power was held
by a propertyless majority, republican government would not long survive. It,
and the liberty that it fostered, would soon be replaced by either a despotic or an
oligarchic regime. 64
For Madison, the solution to this dilemma consisted of two key features:
universal suffrage and large electoral districts. 65 In Federalist No. 57, Madison
emphasized the importance of universal suffrage, stating that both voters and
candidates are to “be the great body of the people of the United States,”
excluding neither the poor, nor the ignorant, nor those of humble birth. 66
Universal suffrage was necessary to ensure that the rights of the majority were
protected. 67 Madison’s understanding of “universal” suffrage was extremely
narrow; while he did include all white males whether propertied or not, he
excluded slaves, racial minorities, Indigenous peoples, and women.
Universal suffrage, however, had to be tempered by the extended sphere. As
Madison posited in Federalist No. 10, in an extended sphere, the “greater variety
of parties and interests” would reduce the likelihood that a majority “will have
a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.” 68 An extended sphere
would also make it more difficult for the citizens to discover and act upon those
interests that they did share. 69 Not only did the extended sphere mechanism
prevent the formation of possibly dangerous coalitions within society, it also
ensured the election of a certain kind of representative. 70 An extended sphere,
Madison explained, implied large electoral districts. To get elected from a large
district, a candidate would need the support of a large number of citizens in a
dispersed area, thereby lessening the chance that he could win the election by
61. Property and Suffrage, supra note 60, at 395.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. James Madison, Observations on Jefferson’s Draught of a Constitution for Virginia, 11
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 288 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., Univ. Press of Virginia
1977) [hereinafter, “Observations”].
65. Property and Suffrage, supra note 60, at 399–400.
66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
67. Property and Suffrage, supra note 60, at 394, 400.
68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 50–51.
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resorting to the use of fraud and corruption. The result, argued Madison, is that
voters “will be more likely to centre on men who possess the most attractive
merit and the most diffusive and established characters.” 71 Madison’s
expectation that the design of political structures would lead to the election of
established and prominent men is referred to by Bernard Manin as the “principle
of distinction.” 72 As Manin noted, Madison hoped that representation would
elevate this “natural aristocracy” of talent and virtue to public office. 73 The
extended sphere, and resulting large electoral districts, would lead to the election
of wealthy, prominent, and civic minded men. 74
Madison’s solution was viewed by the Anti-Federalists as precisely the
problem: the proposed Constitution would establish an aristocratic tyranny in
which a powerful few would rule the people. 75 Modern commentators have
likewise argued that the Constitution concentrated power in the hand of the elite.
Charles Beard contended, for instance, that the Constitution was designed to
protect the interests of the privileged classes. 76 According to Robert Dahl,
Madison designed a political system that would guarantee the liberties of a
wealthy and powerful minority by constitutionally trammeling the majority. 77
Jennifer Nedelsky noted that since the Madisonian model identified the people
as the problem, it was hardly surprising that it did not foster popular
participation. 78 Gordon Wood readily characterized the Framers’ republicanism
as “an elitist theory of democracy.” 79Along the same lines, Emery Lee argued
that Madison favored an “elitist theory of self-government, one that greatly
reduces the role of the people themselves in their own government.” 80 For many
scholars, the Framers established an elitist democracy that deprived the people
of equal participation. 81
71. Id.
72. BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 94 (1997).
73. Id. at 112–13, 116–17.
74. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 50–51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). To be
sure, Madison was a realist: although he hoped that virtuous civic-minded men would be elected,
the entire governmental structure was designed so that ambition would be made to counteract
ambition, thereby harnessing the anticipated self-interest of elected officials in the service of the
public good. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
75. HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 43–44, 48–52, 57–58
(1981).
76. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 152–77 (1913).
77. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 31 (1956).
78. NEDELSKY, supra note 60, at 5.
79. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 517 (1969).
80. Emery G. Lee III, Representation, Virtue, and Political Jealousy in the Brutus-Publius
Dialogue, 59 J. POL. 1073, 1081 (1997).
81. For a discussion of the democratic deficiencies of the Constitution, see ROBERT A. DAHL,
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?, 15–17, 154–57 (2002); SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006).
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Elitist Democracy at the Supreme Court

In the Supreme Court’s recent election law decisions, there are various
continuities with the Framers’ vision of democracy. The comparisons are by no
means exact; indeed, as noted below, there are important discontinuities as well.
Yet there are conceptual resemblances between the Court’s decisions and the
Framers’ approach to democracy that are noteworthy, particularly in light of the
Court majority’s evident departure in recent cases from egalitarian theories of
the judicial supervision of the political process.82 Taking a broad view, the
Constitution established an elitist democracy in which power was intended to be
held for the most part by a privileged few who were to have an outsized influence
on the course of governance. The role of the people was anticipated to be
episodic but their participation, while contained, was nonetheless crucial as a
preventative defense against the abuse of power. Similar themes, whether
intended or not, are evident in the Supreme Court’s recent election law decisions.
1.

The Role of the Wealthy

The first continuity concerns the role of the wealthy. In Madison’s
constitutional vision, the task of governance was to be in the hands of the
wealthy and established members of society.
There is no question that members of Congress are generally well-to-do as
compared to the average citizen. In addition, empirical research shows that the
positions adopted by elected representatives are more responsive to the
preferences of the affluent as compared to the preferences of the vast majority
of citizens. 83 In keeping with an elitist approach to democracy, the Court’s
campaign finance decisions have also enhanced the influence of wealthy
individuals and corporations. In Citizens United v. FEC, for instance, the Court
majority struck down provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act which
restricted independent expenditures for political communications by
corporations. 84 In a significant move, the Court majority narrowed the definition
of corruption, holding that the only governmental interest strong enough to
overcome First Amendment concerns was preventing quid pro quo corruption

82. To be sure, this claim is limited to the Court’s election law decisions. In other areas of law,
the conservative justices may champion the people. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF
CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE POLITICS OF DISRUPTION 75 (2018) (observing that
Justice Scalia embraced an anti-elitist populism).
83. LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
GILDED AGE 116 (2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 77–78 (2012); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning
Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1427, 1433, 1468–72 (2015).
84. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
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or the appearance thereof. 85 The Court’s position was in tension with prior
decisions which had justified campaign finance regulations on a broader
understanding of corruption that included access and influence. 86 The Court
majority also rejected the antidistortion rationale by overturning the holding in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 87 that the government has an interest
in preventing the distortion created by immense wealth on the electoral system. 88
The net effect of these two developments was to significantly reduce the scope
of campaign finance regulations, and, by extension, to amplify the relative
influence of wealthy interests.
That being said, there is a crucial discontinuity between the Court’s recent
campaign finance decisions and the constitutional vision of the Framers.
Madison believed that representatives elected by large electorates would be
highly independent and less susceptible to undue influence and corruption. 89 The
Court majority, however, does not share the Framers’ concerns about the
independence of elected representatives. In McCutcheon v. FEC, for instance,
the Court struck down aggregate limits on contributions as a violation of the
First Amendment. 90 In an opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts held
that the aggregate limits “impose[d] a special burden on broader participation in
the democratic process.” 91 Although “broader participation” usually means
participation by greater numbers of people, for the Court majority it meant more
participation by a single wealthy individual—in this case, Mr. McCutcheon, who
wished to donate $135,000 in the 2013–2014 election cycle. 92 According to the
majority, the First Amendment protects the participatory activity of
“contributing to someone who will advocate for [the donor’s] policy
preferences.” 93 The Court set aside fears that such an exchange might amount to
corruption. 94 Indeed, the majority endorsed the idea that responsiveness to
wealthy donors “embod[ied] a central feature of democracy—that constituents
85. Id. at 359–60. For a discussion of the Court’s approach to the First Amendment, see James
A. Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied
Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 673, 679–80 (2011).
86. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581,
616 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 127–28, 130
(2010).
87. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
88. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363-64. For a discussion of the implications, see Richard L.
Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989,
990–92 (2011); Mark C. Alexander, Citizens United and Equality Forgotten, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 499, 503, 509–11 (2011).
89. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 322 (James Madison).
90. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014).
91. Id. at 204–05.
92. Id. at 194–95.
93. Id. at 204.
94. Id. at 192.
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support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are
elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.” 95 For the Court, this
responsiveness is “key to the very concept of self-governance through elected
officials.” 96 For the Framers, however, an exchange of this kind between
wealthy donors and elected representatives would have fallen within their more
capacious understanding of corruption, which broadly encompassed the use of
public power to serve private ends. 97
2.

The Role of the People

The second continuity concerns the people. It is important to emphasize that
there is not an exact equivalence between the founding era and the Court
majority’s approach. Clearly, there are crucial differences, the most important
one being slavery. In addition, voting during the framing era was not open to
anyone who was not a propertied white male. Despite these important
differences, there are conceptual continuities. While it is true that Madison saw
elections as a key mechanism to keep the powerful accountable, much of the
constitutional infrastructure was designed with a view to contain political
participation.
A similar trend of containing popular participation and restricting the
franchise is evident in the Court’s recent election law decisions. As described
above, the Court’s recent campaign finance decisions devalue popular
participation by providing wealthy interests with an outsized voice. 98 Congress
has become increasingly dependent on a tiny minority of the population, namely
funders and lobbyists, arguably to the detriment of the public good. 99 The Court
majority’s hostility to egalitarian principles was also on display in Arizona Free
Enterprise v. Bennett, in which it struck down part of Arizona’s public financing
scheme on the grounds that a matching funds provision, under which publicly
financed candidates received additional funds if their privately financed
opponents exceeded a set spending limit, violated the First Amendment rights
of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups. 100

95. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 192.
96. Id. at 227.
97. Yasmin Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL. 103, 111–12,
114 (2014).
98. Yasmin Dawood, Democracy Divided: Campaign Finance Regulation and the Right to
Vote, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 21–22 (2014).
99. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN
TO STOP IT 110 (1st ed. 2011); TIMOTHY K. KUHNER, CAPITALISM V. DEMOCRACY: MONEY IN
POLITICS AND THE FREE MARKET CONSTITUTION 219–21 (2014).
100. Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2011). See also Davis v. FEC,
554 U.S. 724, 726, 729 (2008) (holding “Millionaire’s Amendment” in the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act struck down for violating First Amendment).
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Although there are no overt restrictions on voting today because of race or
gender, there are barriers to voting, such as voter qualification rules that have a
disproportionate impact on minority voters and low-income individuals. 101 The
conservative justices on the Supreme Court do not seem to be particularly
concerned about these barriers to voting; after all, they effectively eliminated the
preclearance procedure in Shelby County. 102 The fallout from the decision was
swift. In the wake of Shelby County, many states passed stringent voter
qualification rules, which were justified as promoting electoral integrity but
which were arguably designed to make voting harder, in particular for minority
voters—what amounts to a new form of voter suppression. 103 This development
was aided by the Court’s decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, which held in a fractured opinion that Indiana’s voter identification law
did not violate the Constitution. 104 In a subsequent case, Arizona v. Inter Tribal
Council, the Court majority constrained Congress’ power under the Elections
Clause, finding that it “empowers Congress to regulate how elections are held,
but not who may vote in them.” 105 According to the majority, the states have
jurisdiction over voter qualifications. 106 While the Court in Inter Tribal Council
did find that Arizona’s requirement of documentary proof of citizenship was
invalid as it was pre-empted by the federal National Voter Registration Act
(NVRA), in a more recent decision, Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute,
however, the conservative justices upheld Ohio’s voter purge law of non-voters
even though the NVRA prohibits states from striking voters off the rolls for
failure to vote. 107
3.

The Management of Elections

The third continuity concerns the management of elections. As described by
the Rucho majority, the Framers’ approach to the management of congressional
elections is found in the Elections Clause, 108 which provides the states with the
power to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” for
members of Congress, while giving Congress the power to “make or alter such

101. Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price
of Democracy, 86 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 1023, 1023–30 (2009).
102. Shelby Cty. v. Alabama, 570 U.S. 529, 550–51 (2013).
103. Wendy R. Weiser & Max Feldman, The State of Voting 2018, N. Y.: BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUST. 5 (June 5, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/state-voting-2018
[https://perma.cc/ZV8Q-KZYH]; Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform
Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S. C. L. REV. 689, 712, 717–18 (2006).
104. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 201–04 (2008).
105. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. 1, 16 (2013).
106. Id. The states have jurisdiction due to the voter qualification clauses in Art. I, § 2, cl. 1 and
the 17th Amendment. Id.
107. Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1842–43 (2018).
108. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019).
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Regulations” at any time. 109 During the debates at the Constitutional
Convention, and subsequently during ratification, noted the majority, the
Elections Clause was a subject of dispute. 110 In response to Antifederalist fears
of national power of elections, the Federalists argued that congressional
authority over electoral rules was necessary in the event that state legislatures
undermined fair representation. 111 According to the Court majority, the Framers
opted for a “characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state legislatures,
expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress.” 112 The majority
declined, however, to go so far as to accept the appellants’ contention that
“through the Elections Clause, the Framers set aside electoral issues such as the
one before us as questions that only Congress can resolve.” 113 It observed instead
that “our cases have held that there is a role for the courts with respect to at least
some issues that could arise from a State’s drawing of congressional districts,” 114
noting in particular two such issues—one-person, one-vote and racial
gerrymandering. 115 The Rucho majority also emphasized the Framers’
familiarity with partisan gerrymandering during the ratification of the
Constitution and in subsequent years. 116 This analysis was used by the majority
as one of the reasons why partisan gerrymandering lay beyond the purview of
the federal judiciary.
The difficulty with the majority’s analysis is that it downplays the
importance of elections in the Framers’ constitutional vision. Although the
Framers sought to cabin popular power and influence, they nonetheless believed
that elections were an indispensable safeguard and the principal mechanism by
which to throw out elected officials who were betraying the public trust. In
Federalist No. 51, Madison stated that a “dependence on the people is, no doubt,
the primary control on the government.” 117 To ensure liberty, it was essential
that the legislature “have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate
sympathy with, the people.” 118 According to Madison, “[f]requent elections are
unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be
effectually secured.” 119 Frequent elections force representatives to exercise
restraint in the use of their power in order to ensure reelection. 120 Although the

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495.
Id.
Id. at 2496.
Id. at 2495 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2495–96.
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495.
Id. at 2494–95.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 290 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 295 (James Madison).
Id.
Id.
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people had a limited role in Madison’s constitutional vision it was still a crucial
one: the people were the ultimate stopgap against the abuse of power by elected
officials. As Justice Kagan observed, “[f]ree and fair and periodic elections are
the key to that vision.” 121 Contemporary partisan gerrymandering, however,
seriously undermines the protective power of elections. 122
III. ELECTION LAW AND THE COURT’S ORIGINALIST ORIENTATION
The emerging elitist conception of democracy presents a significant
challenge to the egalitarian conception of democracy that was evident in the
Supreme Court’s election law decisions in the decades following the civil rights
era. The elitist conception of democracy is relevant for another reason: it sheds
light on the increasing significance of the founding era in the Court’s recent
election law decisions. This Part suggests that while neither the Court’s
decisions nor the elitist conception of democracy amount to an originalist
approach to the Constitution, some of the Court majority’s arguments in the
cases display an “originalist orientation.” The concept of an originalist
orientation is meant to capture the idea that the original meaning takes a
preponderant weight in the Court’s analysis and is consistent with the overall
outcome even if it does not strictly speaking compel that outcome. This
originalist orientation has significant implications for future election law cases
because it means that, at least for some issues, the founding era is serving as an
implicit baseline for the conservative wing of the Court. In future cases, this
originalist orientation will likely reinforce the elitist conception of democracy,
and by extension, further erode the egalitarian approach to democracy.
While a detailed exposition of originalism is beyond the scope of this Essay,
it is useful to provide a brief description. According to Lawrence Solum,
originalism is best understood as a “family” of constitutional theories that share
two key features: first, the Fixation Thesis, which means that “original meaning
. . . is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified”; and second, the
Constraint Principle, which refers to the idea that constitutional actors including
judges “ought to be constrained by the original meaning when they engage in
constitutional practice[s]” such as deciding cases. 123 Many constitutional
theorists think that the “original meaning” is determined by the original public
121. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2512, 2514–15. Chief Justice Robert’s response to this objection was that it should
be grounded in the Guarantee Clause in Article IV, § 4 of the Constitution, which “guarantee[s] to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” Id. at 2506 (majority opinion)
(alteration in original). He concluded, however, that in keeping with past decisions, the Guarantee
Clause does not provide the basis for a justiciable claim. Id.
123. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
453, 456 (2013). This brief discussion cannot do justice to Professor Solum’s compelling and
nuanced account of originalism. It does, however, capture the two core ideas around which the
originalist family converges. Id.
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meaning, while others think it is determined by the original intention of the
Framers or by the original methods of constitutional interpretation. 124 While
almost all constitutional theorists (including living constitutionalists) place some
weight on original meaning, 125 what distinguishes originalist interpreters is that
they are bound by the original meaning of the constitutional text. 126
The elitist conception of democracy cannot be described as originalist
despite its affinities with the Framers’ theories of representative government.
Overarching conceptions of democratic self-government are not located in any
one constitutional provision. Nor is it the case that the majority’s election law
decisions either individually or collectively could be described as originalist. As
for the justices on the Supreme Court, only Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch
are described as committed originalists, although there is an argument to be
made, as John McGinnis suggests, that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,
despite not identifying as originalists, have displayed a limited form of
originalism in some of their decisions. 127
That being said, the Court majority has advanced certain arguments that
have originalist elements. These originalist-style arguments appear to be more
common in recent election law decisions than they have been in the decisions of
decades past, at least with respect to the majority judgments. Consider, for
example, the majority’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause. As described in
Part II, the majority provided an analysis of the Elections Clause that
emphasized its original meaning, namely that the Framers had assigned
responsibility over districting to Congress and to the states. 128 The majority also
provided a detailed analysis of partisan gerrymandering at the time of the
framing. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan observed that “[t]o its credit,
the majority does not frame that point as an originalist constitutional
argument.” 129 Justice Kagan went on to say that the reason the Court did not use
an originalist lens is that “racial and residential gerrymanders were also once

124. Id.
125. Id. at 460.
126. Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1674 (2018).
127. John O. McGinnis, Which Justices Are Originalist?, L. & LIBERTY (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.lawliberty.org/2018/11/09/which-justices-are-originalists/ [https://perma.cc/4TPY-W
VUR]. Professor McGinnis observes that while Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch are described
as the Court’s originalists, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are also originalists in two ways:
they follow original meaning in cases of first impression and they “often try to move doctrine in an
originalist direction.” Id. While they will not override non-originalist precedent if it results in “too
much uncertainty in the law or the imposition of large social costs,” they will be partial to the
original meaning when precedent is not too deeply entrenched or too “thick on the ground.” Id.
128. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019).
129. Id. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting). By the words “that point” she is referring to her
assessment that the majority’s response to partisan gerrymanders appears to be that they have
always been “with us.” Id.
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with us, but the Court has done something about that fact.” 130 One possible
interpretation, then, is that the Court majority’s analysis of the Elections Clause
is not originalist; indeed, it is a rejection of originalism because the Court
acknowledged two lines of precedents that show that the federal courts do have
a role in districting. Another possibility is that while the majority did appear to
rely on an originalist-type argument, the status of that argument in the Court’s
analysis is ambiguous. 131
A related possibility is that the majority did not reject an originalist
interpretation so much as execute a careful dodge around a set of existing
precedents. 132 After all, the Rucho majority was at considerable pains to
emphasize that “[a]t no point was there a suggestion that the federal courts had
a role to play [in districting]. Nor was there any indication that the Framers had
ever heard of courts doing such a thing.” 133 The majority also prefaced its brief
description of the two exceptions (one-person, one-vote, and racial
gerrymandering) with the observation that “[e]arly on, doubts were raised about
the competence of the federal courts to resolve these questions.” 134 The
discussion of the malapportionment cases is brief and does not even mention
Reynolds v. Sims. 135 As for racial gerrymandering, the majority stated that laws
that “explicitly discriminate on the basis of race . . . are of course presumptively
invalid,” but the two cases cited are Gomillion v. Lightfoot and Shaw v. Reno. 136
Carving out an exception for one-person, one-vote and racial gerrymandering
could be explained either as deference to existing precedent or as an
acknowledgment that these two exceptions are covered by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The majority’s analysis of the Elections Clause is originalist in its
tone, and its refusal to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering is consistent with its
interpretation of the text. That being said, the majority’s analysis does not appear
to comport with the Constraint Principle, which, as described above, is a
130. Id.
131. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking, supra note 39, at 294, 299 (noting that it is
unclear what work Chief Justice Roberts’ “reliance on originalism is doing in the analysis”);
Stephanopoulos, supra note 10 (noting that while the Rucho majority relied on the Constitution’s
text and history, it was unpersuaded by North Carolina’s originalist interpretation of the Elections
Clause).
132. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 805 (2009) (arguing that the original meaning should give way to
precedent when it is necessary to avoid large social costs, when precedent is entrenched, and when
precedent corrects supermajoritarian failures such as the exclusion of African-Americans and
women).
133. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2496.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2496–97. These two cases pull in opposite directions since Gomillion v. Lightfoot
prevented the state from excluding African-Americans from being represented while Shaw v. Reno
constrained the states’ ability to create majority-minority districts.
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necessary element of an originalist argument. While consistent with the final
outcome, the majority’s reliance on original meaning did not compel the result
since the majority advanced several arguments, including the analysis of
precedents, that also arrived at the same conclusion.
Even if the Court majority’s reliance on the text and history of the
Constitution in its election law decisions is not originalist in a strict sense, some
of the majority’s positions in the cases display an originalist orientation. By
“originalist orientation,” I mean that the arguments about original meaning take
a preponderant weight in the analysis and are consistent with the outcome even
if they do not compel the overall outcome. William Baude draws a distinction
between (1) exclusive originalism, which requires that judges only rely on
original meaning; (2) inclusive originalism, which permits judges to also rely on
precedent which has an “originalist pedigree”; and (3) pluralist accounts, which
hold that there are multiple modalities of constitutional interpretation, including
original meaning. 137 An originalist orientation does not fit within Professor
Baude’s account of exclusive originalism, nor does it necessarily fit within
inclusive originalism. But an originalist orientation also seems to differ from
pluralist accounts that hold that there is no clear hierarchy among the various
modalities of constitutional interpretation. 138 An originalist orientation
privileges original meaning where it can but usually defers to non-originalist
precedent when the disruption to settled law would be too great. 139 In those
instances, an originalist orientation would be less exacting than inclusive
originalism but would place more presumptive weight on original meaning than
a pluralist approach. Under an originalist orientation, original meaning is
authoritative but not compulsory across the board.
The originalist orientation means that, at least for some issues, the founding
era is serving as an implicit baseline for the conservative wing of the Court.
There are three reasons why this originalist orientation matters. First, under an
originalist orientation, non-originalist precedents would likely carry less relative
weight than they would for a living constitutionalist, who would also likely
consult original meaning but would place greater emphasis on stare decisis. In
Shelby County, for example, Chief Justice Roberts was willing to strike down a
key protection provided by the Voting Rights Act on the basis of an argument
that was at least partially based on an originalist interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment. 140 According to the majority, the preclearance process departed
from basic principles of federalism including state autonomy over the regulation

137. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2355, 2362 (2015).
Professor Baude identifies a fourth category in which originalism is not treated as a source of law.
Id. at 2355.
138. Id. at 2404.
139. See McGinnis supra note 127; McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 132, at 805.
140. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543–44 (2013).
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of elections and the principle of equal sovereignty among the states, and for this
reason it could not be justified on the basis of outdated conditions. 141
In Rucho, the majority acknowledged that despite its originalist-style
interpretation of the Elections Clause, the Court does have a role to play in
districting, at least with respect to one-person, one-vote and racial
gerrymandering. 142 One (ominous) possibility, however, is that the same logic
does in fact apply to these two exceptions as well; that is, the Framers never
contemplated that the federal courts would be engaged in overseeing districting
to fix malapportionment and racial gerrymandering. 143 This line of reasoning
could be used at some future point to undercut the relevant precedents thereby
constraining the judicial role with respect to districting. Although this is a remote
possibility given the disruption to settled law, it is not entirely inconceivable
particularly in view of Chief Justice Roberts’ incrementalist strategy of setting
up arguments in one case in order to subsequently deploy them in future cases
to overturn or constrain longstanding precedents.
Second, an originalist orientation has a significant impact on election law
federalism. While in practice the states are primarily responsible for devising
electoral rules, the jurisdictional question as to how to draw a line between state
authority over elections and federal authority over elections is complex and
subject to continuing dispute. 144 The debate is often couched in the language of
state sovereignty versus national sovereignty, with theories tilting towards one
or the other. State sovereignty in election law matters could be viewed as
consistent with the “laboratories of democracy” tradition 145 or with theories that
view states as venues for minority empowerment. 146 That being said, state
sovereignty in election law matters has tended, for the most part and certainly as
a historical matter, to lead to the adoption of rules that are either anti-democratic
or that are consistent with an elitist approach to democracy. The era of Jim Crow
and the resistance to the Voting Rights Act, not to mention slavery itself, are
emblematic of the serious deleterious consequences of state sovereignty. States
have also engaged in practices, such as malapportionment and the adoption of
141. Id.
142. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2019).
143. For a version of this argument, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590–91 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (providing an originalist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that precluded the
application of one-person, one-vote to the states).
144. See Derek T. Muller, The Play in the Joints of the Election Clauses, 13 ELECTION L. J.
310, 311 (2014); Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 752
(2016).
145. The phrase “laboratories of democracy” was used by Justice Brandeis for the idea that a
“[s]tate may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
146. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1794 (2005); Heather
K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All The Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 52 (2010).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

ELECTION LAW ORIGINALISM

631

restrictive voter qualification laws, that have served to undermine political
equality, entrench power, and reduce democratic accountability. By contrast, the
national government has been an important source of laws, such as the Voting
Rights Act, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote
Act, which promote democratic access and equality.
While the Supreme Court in years past addressed and remedied
malapportionment, 147 removed restrictions on voting, 148 prevented racial vote
dilution, 149 and upheld the Voting Rights Act, 150 the current conservative wing
of the Court has been far more deferential to state sovereignty in election-law
matters, even when such deference is not warranted. Franita Tolson argues, for
instance, that the framework of dual federalism is not appropriate for the
Elections Clause because the Clause provides Congress with a broader scope of
power than is recognized by the Court. 151 Under the Elections Clause, the federal
government holds ultimate power over federal elections even in the face of state
sovereignty, subject to a qualified exception involving voter qualification
rules. 152 Rather than treating the federal government and states as sharing power
over federal elections, states should be treated as subordinate to federal
authority. Professor Tolson further urges that because the Elections Clause is an
underenforced constitutional provision, the true scope of federal authority over
elections is misunderstood. 153 For this reason, even extensive federal legislation
relying on the Elections Clause, such as the H.R. 1 bill overhauling the federal
election system, should be treated as a valid exercise of federal authority rather
than as an unconstitutional encroachment on state authority. 154
An originalist orientation to election law federalism often results in
outcomes that are inconsistent with an egalitarian vision of democracy. As
Professor Charles and Professor Fuentes-Rohwer argue, the states are “winning
the federalism battle” and there is “scant evidence” that the states are interested

147. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962).
148. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 663 (1966) (holding poll taxes
unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment).
149. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 755 (1973); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 613 (1982).
150. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 336–37 (1966).
151. Franita Tolson, Election Law “Federalism” and the Limits of the Antidiscrimination
Framework, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2211, 2216–17 (2018). See also Jamal Greene, Judging
Partisan Gerrymanders under the Elections Clause, 114 YALE L. J. 1021 (2005).
152. Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections, 99 B. U. L. REV.
317, 382 (2019) (arguing that although the Court majority has held that the states have exclusive
jurisdiction over voter qualifications, “Congress can intervene when a state voter qualification
standard has significant implications for participation and turn out in federal elections.”).
153. Franita Tolson, The Elections Clause and the Underenforcement of Federal Law, 129
YALE L. J. F. 171, 173–74 (2019).
154. Id. at 174.
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in protecting minority voting rights. 155 The Court’s decision in Shelby County
eviscerated the national oversight of discriminatory electoral practices by
covered jurisdictions. The rationale was to protect the equal sovereignty of
states. Professor Hasen argues that by broadening the scope of state autonomy
under the Tenth Amendment, the Shelby majority ignored how the Fifteenth
Amendment “changed the state-federal balance of power and the scope of the
Tenth Amendment.” 156 By contrast, Justice Ginsburg emphasized in her
dissenting opinion that Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments should be treated with substantial deference by the
Court. 157 Not only does an originalist orientation discount longstanding
precedents, it also privileges the first framing over the second framing, thereby
further diluting the influence of the Reconstruction Amendments. In addition, it
ultimately reinforces a general trend in which the conservative wing of the Court
reserves election law matters to the states. The net outcome is likely to erode
egalitarian democracy and encourage the implementation of an elitist vision of
democracy or, at the very least, not stand in its way.
Third, an originalist orientation could make reform efforts more difficult.
Not only is the Court majority less inclined to view the judicial function through
an Ely-inspired lens, it also takes an originalist and hence formalist view of the
function of Congress and the state governments, treating these institutions as
first responders to democratic malfunctions such as partisan gerrymandering
notwithstanding current political realities of gridlock and partisan selfentrenchment. 158 An originalist orientation could also thwart reform efforts that
are viewed as incompatible with the constitutional text. In Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 159 a majority of
the Court upheld an Arizona ballot measure that established an independent
redistricting commission. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the dissenting opinion,
arguing that the word “Legislature” in the Elections Clause referred to a
representative body, and not the people at large, and hence, the congressional
redistricting authority of the state legislature could not be transferred by ballot
initiative to an independent redistricting commission. 160 In Rucho, however,
Chief Justice Roberts listed independent redistricting commissions as one of the
155. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race, Federalism, and Voting Rights, 2015
UNIV. OF CHI. L. F. 113, 117, 134 (2015).
156. For an analysis, see Hasen, supra note 44, at 731–32.
157. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 560 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158. In Rucho, for instance, the Court majority identified a number of ways that Congress and
the states had and could respond to the problem of partisan gerrymandering. Rucho v. Common
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507–08. For a discussion of the Court’s formalist approach to institutions,
see generally Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public
Law, 1 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2013).
159. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
160. Id. at 2677–78 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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ways in which the states are addressing partisan gerrymandering, 161 even
though, as Justice Kagan pointed out, this solution was inconsistent with his
earlier dissent in Arizona State Legislature. 162 To the extent that future reform
efforts may rely on provisions in the U.S. Constitution, the Court majority’s
originalist orientation could stymie these efforts particularly given the new
configuration of the Court’s conservative majority.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that the Supreme Court’s recent election law
decisions can be understood as instantiating a conception of democracy that is
distinctly elitist in its nature. This elitist conception of democracy is gradually
displacing the egalitarian vision of democracy that was ushered in by the
Supreme Court during the civil rights era. In recent years the Court majority has
refused to check the undemocratic impulses emanating from the states and
indeed has tacitly allowed such impulses in keeping with the emerging elitist
model of democracy. Future election law decisions will no doubt involve a
similar clash between an elitist approach to democracy, as espoused by the
Court’s conservative wing, and an egalitarian approach to democracy, as
defended by the liberal wing.
The Court’s emerging elitist vision of democracy has significant continuities
with the founding era. Even if not originalist in the strict sense, the Court
majority’s orientation to the framing era has significant implications for the
future of election law. All three of the trends that result from its originalist
orientation—discounting non-originalist precedents, favoring the states over the
national government when deciding jurisdictional questions, and making reform
efforts more difficult—also have the consequence of reinforcing elitist
democracy and eroding egalitarian democracy. If 1789 is the Court majority’s
implicit baseline, many phenomena that are problematic from an egalitarian
democratic perspective will not seem particularly troubling. The Court’s
originalist orientation is also selective; for instance, it gives insufficient weight
to the Reconstruction Amendments, which can be understood in egalitarian
terms, and which are part of the constitutional text after all, but which are playing
an increasingly constrained role in the majority’s decisions. In sum, the Court
majority’s orientation to the founding era poses a direct threat to all the gains
that have been achieved over the last several decades which have rendered
democratic self-government more inclusive, more equal, and more responsive
to the people.
161. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507.
162. Id. at 2524 (Kagan, J., dissenting). According to Professor Stephanopoulos, Chief Justice
Roberts’ position in Arizona State Legislature “plainly amounts to a perverse Carolene position,”
since it prevents other political actors from taking steps to remedy democratic malfunctions.
Stephanopoulos, supra note 10.
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